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We study whether bank efficiency is related to bank ownership in Russia. We find that for-
eign banks are more efficient than domestic private banks and – surprisingly – that domes-
tic private banks are not more efficient than domestic public banks. These results are not 
driven by the choice of production process, the bank’s environment, management’s risk 
preferences, the bank’s activity mix or size, or the econometric approach. The evidence in 
fact suggests that domestic public banks are more efficient than domestic private banks and 
that the efficiency gap between these two ownership types did not narrow after the intro-
duction of deposit insurance in 2004. This may be due to increased switching costs or to 
the moral hazard effects of deposit insurance. The policy conclusion is that the efficiency 
of the Russian banking system may benefit more from increased levels of competition and  
greater access of foreign banks than from bank privatization. 
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Tutkimme sitä, vaikuttaako venäläisten pankkien omistusrakenne niiden tehokkuuteen. Tu-
lostemme mukaan ulkomaalaiset pankit ovat tehokkaampia kuin yksityiset venäläisten 
pankit. Yllättävää on se, että yksityiset pankit eivät tehokkaampia kuin julkisesti omistetut 
pankit. Näihin tuloksiin eivät vaikuta pankkien valitsema toimintatapa, toimintaympäristö, 
johdon preferenssit riskin suhteen, palveluvalikoima, koko tai käyttämämme analyysime-
netelmä. Näyttää jopa siltä, että julkisesti omistetut pankit ovat tehokkaampia kuin yksityi-
set pankit, eikä tehokkuuskuilu ole pienentynyt vuoden 2004 jälkeen, jolloin Venäjällä tuli 
käyttöön talletustakuujärjestelmä. Saattaa olla, että johtuu pankin vaihtamiseen liittyvien 
kulujen noususta tai talletustakuun aiheuttamista käyttäytymismuutoksista. Näyttää siis 
siltä, että Venäjän pankkijärjestelmä hyötyisi enemmän kilpailun lisääntymisestä ja ulko-
maisten pankkien tulosta markkinoille kuin pankkien yksityistämisestä. 
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1  Introduction 
 
This paper assesses the efficiency of the nascent Russian banking system. The central 
question we pose is whether bank ownership has any effect on bank efficiency in Russia. 
We distinguish between foreign-owned banks (foreign banks), privately owned banks (pri-
vate banks) and state-owned banks (public banks). We find that foreign banks are more 
efficient than domestic private banks and – surprisingly – that domestic private banks are 
not more efficient than domestic public banks. These results are not driven by differences 
in activity mix, risk preferences or bank environment, nor by the absence of explicit de-
posit insurance for domestic private banks. 
Transition countries appear to be fertile testing grounds for comparative analysis of 
public and private banks’ efficiency, but first appearances can be deceiving. Indeed, this 
comparative analysis failed to yield clear answers because in most countries foreign entry 
and bank privatization went hand in hand. As a consequence the empirical results for these 
countries were largely interpreted in terms of efficiency gaps between foreign and domes-
tic ownership rather than between public and private ownership. In Russia however partial 
bank privatization was achieved relatively quickly, while foreign bank entry remained at a 
relatively low level in the first 15 years of transition
1. Still, partial public ownership in 
various forms remained a robust characteristic of the Russian banking sector throughout 
the transition. The Central Bank of Russia (CBR) has played an important role through the 
commercial banks under its direct control, namely Sberbank and Vneshtorgbank. In addi-
tion, government bodies at several levels own banks. There are examples of villages, prov-
inces, cities, federal bodies and state firms in this position. For October 2001 for example, 
we find that the 27 banks that are majority owned by state bodies (out of 1277 banks in to-
tal) control 53% of banking assets and 39% of banking liabilities. Neglecting the CBR’s 
commercial banking activities through Sberbank and Vneshtorgbank., the remaining 25 
public banks hold no less than 6% of total banking assets and 8% of total banking liabili-
ties. The Russian banking industry therefore presents us with the exceptional opportunity 
to disentangle efficiency differences between foreign, public and private banks for a suffi-
ciently large number of banks. This study therefore complements the literature on foreign 
 
1 The Central Bank of Russia (CBR) repeatedly showed its eagerness to restrict foreign entry to the banking sec-
tor. The Association of Russian Banks has consistently lobbied the government to limit foreign bank entry using 
the classic infant industry protection argument. Russia was ultimately forced to commit itself to a gradual open-
ing of its financial market to foreign competition because of its desire to enter the WTO. Alexei Karas, Koen Schoors and Laurent Weill 
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ownership and efficiency in emerging market economies and its conclusions contribute to 
our understanding of emerging-market-economy banking sectors.  
Efficiency comparisons between public and private banks are cumbersome in 
emerging market economies because the two types of banks operate in different institu-
tional environments; for example the implicit full deposit insurance typically enjoyed by 
public banks does not cover private banks. Any differences found in cost effectiveness be-
tween private and public banks may therefore be attributable to this difference in deposit 
insurance, which may render public banks’ access to deposits less costly in terms of labor 
and physical capital. In Russia too, public banks were always covered, albeit implicitly, by 
deposit insurance, while household deposits held at private banks have been covered by 
deposit insurance only since 2004. To control for this we perform our estimations for two 
sub-samples, one before (2002) and one after (2006) the introduction of deposit insurance 
for household deposits at private banks. This allows us to assess whether any difference in 
efficiency may be partly attributable to differences in deposit insurance and whether the 
more level playing field of generalized deposit insurance for household deposits effectively 
reduces the efficiency difference. 
In the following section we overview the bank efficiency literature related to our 
study. Section 3 presents the recent history of the Russian banking sector. This is followed 
by an overview of the data in section 4 and the estimation methodology in section 5. Sec-
tion 6 lays out the main results. Section 7 provides further robustness checks by repeating 
the analysis for a size -matched sample and employing a very different econometric ap-
proach. We end with concluding remarks in section 8. 
 
 
2  Related literature 
 
The empirical literature on privatization in transition countries has found that the method 
and timing of privatization are related to its performance effects. Frydman et al. (1999) 
find that privatization has no beneficial effect on performance if firms fall under the sway 
of insider owners (managers or employees), while the positive performance effect is pro-
nounced if the firm is privatized to outsider owners. Brown et al. (2006) document that BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




foreign privatization has larger productivity effects than domestic privatization in a set of 
four transition countries.  
There is also ample evidence for transition countries that foreign firms are more ef-
ficient than domestic firms, be it in the banking sector or in other sectors. Foreign banks 
may be more efficient than domestic ones because of their more advanced technology, su-
perior management practices, superior access to capital or implicit deposit insurance via 
the deep pockets of the foreign mother bank. 
These economy-wide results are sustained by more detailed banking sector studies 
that apply stochastic frontier models. Weill (2003) shows in a study of the Czech Republic 
and Poland that foreign-owned banks are indeed more efficient than domestic-owned 
banks and that this is driven neither by differences in bank size nor by differences in the 
structure of activities. Hasan and Marton (2003) find in a Hungarian country-study that 
foreign banks were more efficient already in the period 1993-1997, early in transition. 
Fries and Taci  (2005), in a study of 15 East European transition countries (including Rus-
sia), find that private banks are more cost efficient than state-owned banks. This confirms 
the result of Weill (2003) that privatized banks with majority foreign ownership are the 
most cost efficient. These are followed by newly established private banks, both domestic 
and foreign owned, and finally by privatized banks with majority domestic ownership, 
though these are still more efficient than state-owned banks. Bonin et al. (2005a) analyze 
the effects of ownership on bank efficiency for a set of eleven transition countries for the 
period 1996-2000. They apply a stochastic frontier approach to compute bank-specific ef-
ficiency scores and relate these to ownership in second-stage regressions. Foreign-owned 
banks are again confirmed to be more cost-efficient and to collect more deposits and grant 
more loans than other banks. The magnitude of increased efficiency from foreign owner-
ship is 6% or higher. State-owned banks are not appreciably less efficient than de novo 
domestic private banks, but they are clearly less efficient than those already privatized, 
which supports the idea that better banks were privatized first. In a companion paper with 
comparable methodology, Bonin et al. (2005b) analyze whether the method and timing of 
bank privatization affect bank efficiency. They find that voucher privatization does not 
lead to increased efficiency and early-privatized banks are more efficient than later-
privatized banks.  
Kraft, Hofler and Payne (2006) study the Croatian banking system and find that 
new private and privatized banks are not more efficient than public banks and that privati-Alexei Karas, Koen Schoors and Laurent Weill 
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zation does not immediately improve efficiency, while foreign banks are substantially 
more efficient than all domestic banks. 
A number of studies apply data envelopment analysis to examine bank efficiency in 
Central and Eastern Europe. These include for example Grigorian and Manole (2006), who 
study 17 European transition countries, Jemric and Vujcic (2002), who look at Croatia, and 
Havrylchyk (2006), who studies Poland. In accordance with the findings of the stochastic 
frontier literature, all these studies find that foreign banks are more efficient than domestic 
ones. Grigorian and Manole (2006) find in addition that privatization does not automati-
cally lead to higher efficiency, which is in line with Bonin et al. (2005a). This superior ef-
ficiency of foreign banks is however not always found in other emerging market econo-
mies. Sensarma (2006) finds that in India foreign banks are less efficient than either public 
or private domestic banks. 
Two studies investigate bank efficiency in Russia. Fries and Taci (2005) study the 
cost efficiency of banks from 15 post-communist countries including Russia, between 1994 
and 2001. They apply the one-stage Battese-Coelli (1995) stochastic frontier model and 
find that foreign ownership and private ownership are both associated with greater effi-
ciency. Their findings, however, are based on a cross-country sample and so need not hold 
equally for every country. This observation holds particularly for Russia, given their very 
limited sample of Russian banks (48 out of more than 1000 existing banks). 
Styrin (2005) solves these problems by using a large dataset of Russian banks ob-
tained from the Central Bank of Russia for the period 1999-2002. While efficiency scores 
are estimated in a first stage using the stochastic frontier approach, they are regressed on a 
set of potential determinants, including public ownership and foreign ownership, in a sec-
ond stage. Public ownership is innovatively defined as actual affiliation with the state as 
measured by the ratio of interest income received from the government to total interest in-
come. This paper concludes in favor of a greater efficiency of foreign banks, whereas pub-
lic ownership is not significant for explaining efficiency. The econometric two-stage ap-
proach and the exclusion of physical capital from the list of inputs are the paper’s major 
limitations.  
We use a similar dataset extended to 2006 and adopt the one-stage approach pro-
posed by Battese and Coelli (1995) to investigate the cost efficiency of Russian banks. Be-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




                                                
sides avoiding the limitations of previous studies we contribute to the literature by studying 




3  History and problems of the Russian banking sector 
 
The privatization of Russia’s former ‘spetsbanki’
2 was a relatively uncontrolled process 
that started before 1990, the official start of the bank privatization process, and was largely 
accomplished by the end of 1991, when the Soviet system collapsed. This secessionist pri-
vatization yielded a few large successors (Sberbank, Vneshtorgbank, Mosbiznesbank, 
Promstroibank and SBS–Agro) and more than 600 relatively small successors. Most of 
these were reluctant to restructure, as mirrored in higher costs, higher loan rates, poorer 
loan quality and smaller capital buffers (see Schoors, 2003). Not surprisingly most of the 
smaller successors faltered during the period 1995-1998. In the aftermath of the August 
1998 crisis, the larger successors were also swept away, with the notorious exceptions of 
Sberbank and Vneshtorgbank, which survived as daughters of the CBR and now control a 
considerable part of the Russian banking market
3. At present, the vast majority of Russian 
banks are not burdened by lingering Soviet deficiencies. Most private banks are de novo 
banks, as the privatized ‘spetsbanki’ faltered in the period 1992-1999, and most public 
banks were created after the collapse of the Soviet Union, by government bodies such as 
state enterprises, cities and federal, regional or local governments (see Tompson, 2004 and 
Vernikov, 2007). In our sample we include 25 in the latter category. Still, the banking sec-
tor has faced serious problems throughout its history. 
Early in transition, banks clearly preferred speculation to lending (Schoors, 2001). 
Bank lending to the non-financial sector shrank year after year as a share of total banking 
assets, up to 1999.  In 2003, bank loans to the non- financial sector amounted to just 17.0% 
 
2 In 1987 the Soviet Union turned its monobank system into a kind of two-tier banking system with a embryonal 
central bank (Gosbank) and specialized ‘commercial banks’. The latter were Sberbank (the savings bank), Prom-
stroibank (industry and construction), Zhilsotsbank (housing and communal financing), Agroprombank (Agricul-
ture) and Vneshtorgbank.(foreign trade). These specialized banks are commonly referred to as ‘spetsbanki’. 
3 In its 2005 Annual Report, Sberbank claims to hold 54.2% of total retail deposits, 44.1% of consumer loans, 
32.2% of corporate loans, 16.6% of government securities and 26.5% of total Russian banking assets. The share 
in ruble-denominated retail deposits is even higher - over 70%. Alexei Karas, Koen Schoors and Laurent Weill 
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of GDP and financed as little as 4.8% of fixed investment.
4 Since then, the situation has 
improved. This reluctance to lend seems rational with hindsight. The presence of soft legal 
constraints (Perotti, 2002) rendered the enforcement of overdue claims difficult or impos-
sible. Bank lending was further depressed by huge information asymmetries between banks 
and their prospective customers, and by a lack of screening and monitoring skills in the 
banks themselves and the economy at large. Banks were therefore unable to identify good 
potential borrowers (Brana, Maurel and Sgard, 1999), and often preferred not to lend at all. 
Moreover, the vast number of tiny banks and the lack of a transparent information system 
for credit histories may have contributed to lending restraint (Pyle, 2002).  
The largest part of the lending went to connected agents, regardless of the viability 
of the lending project, and with only very weak monitoring incentives (Laeven, 2001). 
Many of the newly founded private banks were captured by their owners. Such “pocket 
banks” operated as treasuries for a firm or a group of firms rather than independent banks. 
Note that the government, too, is to some extent a connected party, because several banks 
were captured by local, regional, or national governments. At the start of 2003, federal or 
regional authorities held majority stakes in 23 banks, the regional authorities held minority 
stakes in several more banks, and a large number of state enterprises were part-owners of 
banks (Tompson, 2004).  
The average loan quality was negatively affected by the combined problems of 
connected lending, soft legal constraints, information asymmetries and the lack of screen-
ing and monitoring skills. A leaked analysis of Russian banks after the crisis of August 
1998 shows that the major problem for banks was not the devaluation loss or the govern-
ment default on treasury bills, but bad loans hidden and accumulated during the preceding 
period.
5  Schoors and Sonin (2005) explain how the Russian banking system was stuck in a 
passivity trap, where it is rational for each individual bank to hide bad loans rather than 
collecting them. Economic growth after 2000 allowed Russian banks to ‘grow’ out of bad 
loans, but the problem of loan quality is still a latent threat to the Russian banking system.  
The Russian banking sector has in the past suffered from poor capitalization, espe-
cially considering the poor quality of assets and the large exposure to exchange rate risk. 
This overexposure was revealed when the devaluation in August 1998 changed the capital 
 
4 Data from the CBR Bulletin of Bank Statistics. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




                                                                                                                                                   
of many Russian banks from positive to negative overnight (Perotti, 2002). The CBR has 
steadily tightened capital standards since 1999, and Claeys and Schoors (2007) show that 
these standards are indeed enforced. As a result, capital levels have reached more accept-
able levels. Still our data reveal that the average capitalization of the Russian banks is sub-
stantially higher than the weighted average capitalization, implying that capital buffers are 
lower in the banks that are most important for systemic stability. 
The institutional stability of Russian banks has proven weak, with systemic prob-
lems in 1994, 1995, 1998 and 2004. Since 1992, more than 2000 Russian banks have been 
liquidated or have vanished. Sometimes this was due to a combination of the above-
mentioned factors (poor capitalization, excessive speculative risk, endemic bad loans, con-
nected lending, etc.), but there were also several instances of Ponzi schemes, where crooks 
cheated depositors and fled with their money. In the aftermath of the August 1998 crisis it 
became apparent that the soft legal constraints faced by banks encouraged asset stripping 
and left creditors to bear the brunt of the cost of failure (Perotti, 2002). Claeys and Schoors 
(2007) give an overview of the CBR’s relatively weak prudential supervision and control 
during the first decade and show that rule-based enforcement of bank standards is difficult 
for the CBR because of conflicts with systemic stability concerns. Depositors reacted to 
this widespread institutional instability by either disciplining their banks in a sophisticated 
way
6 (Karas, Pyle and Schoors, 2006) or fleeing to the safe heavens of Sberbank and 
Vneshtorgbank that – like all public banks – were covered by an implicit state guarantee
7 
(see OECD, 2004). Figure 1 shows how Sberbank’s share of private deposits
8 reached a 
peak of close to 80% in 1998.    
The government wanted to restore some competition in the deposit market and re-
acted by providing a form of partial deposit insurance. The federal law on deposit insur-
ance was introduced in 2003, but the system only became operational in September 2004
9. 
Sberbank was initially exempted and kept its full state guarantee until 1 January 2007, 
 
5 See ’The newly-wed and the nearly dead’, Euromoney, June 1999. 
6 By interpreting very high promised deposit rates as a proxy for institutional instability. 
7 Sberbank has a huge branch network and carries a government guarantee. The government lent credibility to 
this guarantee by supporting Sberbank when needed and using it as a device to absorb deposits from large de-
funct deposit banks in the aftermath of the 1998 crisis. The same holds for Vneshtorgbank, as demonstrated in 
the mini-crisis in May–July 2004, when Vneshtorgbank acquired Gutabank, one of the larger deposit banks under 
attack. As a result, Sberbank and Vneshtorgbank continue to dominate a highly concentrated deposit market.  
8 Both ruble- and foreign currency-denominated private deposits. 
9 Although an unrelated and opaque form of state guarantee was already granted to all banks in July 2004, to stop 
the unfolding banking panic. Alexei Karas, Koen Schoors and Laurent Weill 
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when it finally became subject to the new deposit insurance scheme. Other regulatory ad-
vantages of Sberbank (for example lower required reserves on ruble deposits) were also 
abolished. This gradually more level playing field ensured that Sberbank’s share of private 
deposits gradually fell during the last five years to the still-very-high level of about 50% in 
2006 (see figure 1).  
In table 1 we summarize some of the crucial indicators of recent developments in 
the Russian banking system. By early 2006 there were 1253 banks, among which only 
1045 money deposit banks (covered by the deposit insurance scheme) with 3295 bank 
branches. More than 30% of these bank branches were however still operated by Sberbank, 
such that the average bank had about two branches. Clearly the average Russian bank is 
tiny by European or world standards. By 2006 the Russian market included 62 majority 
foreign-owned banks, but their branch network was still relatively underdeveloped. On the 
other hand banking has clearly revived during the last five years, with bank lending rising 
from 17% of GDP in 2001 to 32% in 2006 and private deposits rising from 8% of GDP to 
14% over the same period. Average interest rates seem still high in nominal terms but are 
low once inflation is taken into account. Clearly Russian banks are increasingly playing 
their role as effective intermediaries between saving and investment, but the banking sys-
tem still suffers from the predominance of tiny banks with underdeveloped branch net-
works, excessive concentration, and a lack of foreign competition. Although private de-
posit collection is growing, it remains far behind corporate lending.  
 
 
4  Data and variables 
 
The quarterly bank balances and profit and loss accounts were made available to the aut-
hors by the financial information agency Interfax10. The chosen sample periods (2002 and 
2006) are convenient to properly detect longitudinal effects of private ownership. Brown et 
al (2006) find that positive effects of domestic privatization appear immediately in Hunga-
ry, Romania, and Ukraine, but emerge only five years after privatization in Russia. In our 
study almost all remaining banks are de novo banks and the few remaining privatized BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




                                                                                                                                                   
banks are considered 10 years or more after privatization, so any positive efficiency effects 
are expected to have appeared by then.  
The panel is unbalanced because some banks fail, some merge, and some are 
founded during the sample period. If a bank merged or was acquired, we treat the resulting 
larger bank as “new”. To identify foreign banks, we use the quarterly lists of 100% for-
eign-owned banks provided by the CBR since 1999. The lists of banks with the state as a 
majority owner are available at two points in time, February 1, 2002 (Matovnikov, 2002) 
and July 1, 2005 (Mamontov, 2005). These lists reveal that the state ownership category 
remains stable over our sample period. 
We do estimations for the periods before (2002) and after (2006) the introduction of 
deposit insurance in 2004. For each sub-period, we use a balanced panel which is more 
convenient for application of the Battese-Coelli (1995) model. As efficiency scores are 
relative measures of performance, we need to have comparable banks in terms of activities. 
We therefore keep only banks with more-than 10% shares of deposits and loans in total 
assets. Our final sample consists of 747 banks (including 19 public banks and 26 foreign 
banks) for 2002 and 471 banks (including 15 public banks and 20 foreign banks) for 2006. 
The literature disagrees on the role of deposits in banks' production process. The 
classical production approach treats deposits and loans as outputs, and labor and physical 
capital as inputs. The intermediation approach first used by Sealey and Lindley (1977) 
views banks as intermediaries between saving and investment in the economy, and treats 
earning assets as outputs and deposits as inputs. 
The weak development of financial markets makes a clear focus on the lending and 
deposit activities of banks relevant for Russia. Therefore we tend to prefer the production 
approach in this paper. The intermediation approach has the disadvantage that deposits are 
neglected as an important output. But there is also an argument in favor of the intermedia-
tion approach. Public and foreign banks might have access to cheaper funding if depositors 
believe those banks to possess additional protection compared to private domestic banks. 
Public banks have enjoyed the explicit state guarantee backing their retail deposits, which 
was scrapped only at the end of 2003. In addition, their cost of funds is reduced by the per-
ception that the state will stand behind them (Tompson, 2004). Foreign banks’ deposits 
may also enjoy an implicit (by the mother bank) or an explicit deposit guarantee (in some 
 
10 Karas and Schoors (2005) provide a detailed description of the dataset and confirm its consistency with other 
data sources. Alexei Karas, Koen Schoors and Laurent Weill 
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countries, clients of foreign branches of domestic banks are covered by the national deposit 
insurance scheme). Such guarantees – perceived or real – could affect input prices for de-
posits, but this is not considered in the production approach, where the cost of deposits is 
not included in the total cost. This provides a rationale for the intermediation approach, 
which considers deposits as an input rather than an output and includes the cost of deposits 
in the measure of total costs. In robustness checks, we substitute the intermediation for the 
production approach. Our results are however robust to the choice of the production proc-
ess. This is not unexpected, given the finding of Wheelock and Wilson (1995) and Berger 
et al. (1997) that the choice of approach may have a considerable impact on the level of 
efficiency scores but not on their rankings. 
For the production approach, the output variables are total deposits and total loans. 
The input prices are the price of physical capital, measured by the ratio of other operating 
expenses to fixed assets, and the price of labor, measured by the ratio of personnel ex-
penses to total assets,
11 as data on the number of employees is not available (Altunbas et al. 
2000, Weill, 2003). As observed by Maudos et al. (2002), the latter ratio can be interpreted 
as labor cost per worker (personnel expenses to number of employees) adjusted for differ-
ences in labor productivity (number of employees to total assets), since it is the product of 
these ratios. Total costs are the sum of personnel expenses and other operating expenses. 
Controls for environment, risk preferences and activities mix include seven geographical 
district dummies, the log of total assets, the log of equity, the share of bad loans in total 
loans, and the percentage breakdown of banks’ total deposits and loans by counterpart 
(households, firms, government, banks).  
For the intermediation approach, the output variables are total loans and total secu-
rities, while input prices are the deposit rate (measured as the ratio of interest paid on de-
posits to interest bearing deposits), the price of physical capital (defined above), and the 
price of labor (defined above). Total costs are the sum of interest paid on deposits, person-
nel expenses and other operating expenses. 
Table 2 compares the means of key variables of private and public banks. Table 3 does the 
same for domestic and foreign banks. Both public and foreign banks are much bigger, 
slightly less capitalized and more frequently located in the Moscow area, relative to their BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




                                                                                                                                                   
counterparts, respectively, private and domestic banks. These patterns are more pro-
nounced in the second sub-period. Compared to private banks, public banks grant rela-
tively more loans to companies and banks and relatively less loans to households. Not sur-
prisingly, public banks rely relatively more on the government as a source of funding. For-
eign banks are extremely active on the interbank market, in terms of both borrowing and 
lending, while domestic banks are predominantly occupied with core activities: granting 
loans to companies and individuals, and collecting core deposits. For all bank categories, 
household deposits have over time become a much more important source of funding. 
 
 
5  Methodology 
 
This section develops the methodology used to estimate cost efficiency of Russian banks. 
Cost efficiency refers to how close a bank’s cost is to what an optimal bank’s cost would 
be for producing the same bundle of outputs. It also concerns waste in the production proc-
ess and the optimality of the chosen mix of inputs. 
Several techniques have been proposed in the literature to measure efficiency with 
frontier approaches. While nonparametric approaches (e.g. DEA) use linear programming 
techniques, parametric approaches, such as the stochastic frontier approach, apply econo-
metric tools to estimate the efficiency frontier. We adopt the stochastic frontier approach in 
our study, following many studies on banking efficiency in transition countries (Weill, 
2003; Bonin et al., 2005a; Fries and Taci, 2005). In comparison to DEA, this approach has 
the advantage of disentangling inefficiency from statistical noise, taking exogenous events 
into account in the residual (distance from the efficiency frontier). In section 7 we also pre-
sent DEA estimates as additional robustness checks. 
The stochastic frontier approach assumes that total cost deviates from optimal cost 
by a random disturbance, v, and an inefficiency term, u. Thus the cost function is TC =  
f(Y, P) + ε  where TC represents total cost, Y is the vector of outputs, P the vector of input 
prices and ε the error term which is the sum of u and v. u is a one-sided component repre-
senting cost inefficiencies, meaning the degree of weakness of managerial performance. v 
is a two-sided component representing random disturbances, reflecting luck or measure-
 
11 We use the Tukey box-plot to detect outliers: for each input price, we drop observations lying beyond the Alexei Karas, Koen Schoors and Laurent Weill 
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ment errors. u and v are independently distributed, with u assumed to have a truncated 
normal distribution and v to have a normal distribution. σv² and σu² are the respective vari-
ances of u and v. According to Jondrow et al. (1982), firm-specific estimates of ineffi-
ciency terms can be calculated by using the distribution of the inefficiency term condi-
tional on the estimate of the composite error term. 
The more straightforward procedure is the so-called “two-stage procedure”: in the 
first stage the stochastic frontier model is estimated, and in the second stage the efficiency 
scores obtained are regressed on a set of explanatory variables including ownership vari-
ables. Although often applied in the literature, this two-stage procedure presents two im-
portant econometric problems, as noted by Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000). First, it assumes 
that the efficiency terms are identically distributed in the estimation of the stochastic fron-
tier model of the first stage, while in the second stage this assumption is contradicted by 
the fact that the regression of the efficiency terms on the explanatory variables suggests 
that the efficiency terms are not identically distributed. Second, the explanatory variables 
must be assumed to be uncorrelated with the variables of the cost frontier function, or else 
the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the cost frontier function would be 
biased because of the omission of the explanatory variables in the first stage. But then, the 
estimated efficiency terms that are explained in the second stage are biased estimates, as 
they are estimated relative to a biased representation of the cost frontier. 
Therefore, we chose the “one-stage procedure” proposed by Battese and Coelli 
(1995), which solves these econometric problems. They propose a procedure for panel 
data, in which the non-negative inefficiency term is assumed to have a truncated distribu-
tion with different means for each firm. As a result, the distributions of the inefficiency 
terms are not the same, but are expressed as functions of explanatory variables. The ineffi-
ciency terms are then independently but not identically distributed. They are obtained by 
truncation at zero of the N(μit , σu²) distribution: μit = zit δ, where zit is a vector of explana-
tory variables, and δ   is a vector of parameters to be estimated. 
The estimated model consists of the cost frontier function and an equation explain-
ing inefficiency. As is common in the literature on bank efficiency in transition countries 
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(Weill, 2003, Bonin et al., 2005a, Fries and Taci, 2005), we use a standard translog specifi-
cation of the cost frontier: 
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⎠  (1) 
 
where TC is total cost, ym m
th bank output (m=1,2), pl the price of labor, pk the price of 
physical capital, and ε the composite error term. Inefficiency is a function of bank-specific 
variables: 
 
uit =δ zit + Wit      ( 2 )  
 
where uit is the inefficiency, zit is a p*1 vector of explanatory variables, δ is a 1*p vector of 
parameters to be estimated, Wit is a random variable defined by the truncation of the nor-
mal distribution with mean zero, and σ² = σu² + σv² is the variance. 
 
 
6  Results 
 
We estimate the efficiency model for the period before generalized deposit insurance 
(2002) and after generalized deposit insurance (2006) to see whether the implementation of 
deposit insurance has modified the differences in efficiency between banks with different 
types of ownership. In all estimations, we include bank ownership variables in the equation 
explaining inefficiency. Two alternative definitions of public ownership are employed. On 
the one hand, we include a dummy variable taking the value of one if the bank is publicly-
owned. On the other hand, following Styrin (2005), we measure public ownership by the 
ratio of interest income received from the government to total interest income. Foreign 
ownership is taken into account through a dummy variable equaling one if the bank is for-
eign-owned. 
Insert table 4 around here 
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Table 4 presents the main results. Panel A gives the results for public banks defined ac-
cording to ownership; panel B for public banks defined according to their activities. In the 
interpretation, one must keep in mind that the econometric model identifies inefficiency. 
Therefore a minus sign indicates that an increase in the explanatory variable implies lower 
inefficiency, i.e. higher efficiency. 
The baseline specification (a) of panel A shows that foreign banks are more effi-
cient than domestic private banks and public banks, and that public banks are more effi-
cient than domestic private banks after the introduction of deposit insurance. Indeed, while 
the estimates for public ownership are negative and insignificant in specification (a), speci-
fication (d) indicates that the efficiency gap between public banks and domestic private 
banks becomes significant after the introduction of generalized deposit insurance. In an 
economic sense, the efficiency differences are considerable. This is also true in panel B 
where public banks are identified according to their activities rather than their ownership.  
In the baseline specifications (a) and (d), we implicitly assume that the bank’s envi-
ronment (determined by its location) and risk preferences are management choices. One 
could however argue that environment is exogenous to management decisions. Conse-
quently, the influence of environment should be disentangled, to get a satisfactory measure 
of bank efficiency. In this strand of literature, Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000) have no-
tably shown that environment can explain cross-country differences in bank efficiency. 
Furthermore, Hugues and Mester (1993) and Mester (1996) have shown that efficiency dif-
ferences may also derive from differences in managers’ risk preferences. Indeed the degree 
of risk aversion has an impact on cost efficiency. Risk-loving managers may keep the capi-
tal down to its cost-minimizing level (the regulatory threshold), while risk-averse managers 
may prefer to hold higher levels of capital. Consequently, by omitting the level of equity 
from the cost frontier, we may consider a bank inefficient although it behaves optimally 
given the risk preferences of its managers. Berger and Mester (1997) provide an additional 
reason to include the level of equity in the estimation of the cost efficiency model, based 
on the fact that the bank's insolvency risk depends on the equity available to absorb losses. 
This insolvency risk may lead to higher bank costs
12. This issue takes on particular impor-
 
12 In our framework, higher solvency risk could affect the costs included in the cost function through higher la-
bor costs and higher costs of physical capital (to convince depositors to make their deposits, banks with lower 
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tance in transition economies like Russia where the insolvency risk of banks is not negligi-
ble. 
In specifications (b) before generalized deposit insurance and (e) after generalized 
deposit insurance, we therefore include some environmental variables in the cost frontier.  
We use information on the district of the bank, taking into consideration the geographical 
breakdown of Russia into 7 districts. We therefore include in the cost frontier 6 dummy 
variables, equaling one if the bank is located in the concerned district. In specifications (c) 
and (f), we include the logarithm of equity in the estimation of the cost frontier to control 
for risk preferences, in addition to environmental variables, following notably Mester 
(1996), Altunbas et al. (2000) and Weill (2003). All these specifications show that the 
baseline results are very robust. Foreign banks are consistently the most efficient ones, and 
public banks are consistently more efficient than domestic private banks.  
This first set of results suggests that in Russia public banks are more rather than 
less efficient than domestic private banks. This is in accordance with Styrin (2005) but dif-
fers from Fries and Taci (2005). Note however that the latter study obtained results on a 
cross-country sample from 15 transition countries including only a very limited sample of 
Russian banks. In addition, our results surprisingly suggest that this efficiency advantage 
was enhanced rather than reduced by the implementation of the deposit insurance scheme. 
Since the results in table 4 do not take into account the possible effect of systematic 
differences in the deposit rate
13, table 5 repeats the regressions of table 4, applying the in-
termediation approach instead of the production approach. In the intermediation approach 
the deposit rate is an input cost in the cost function and the total deposit cost is included in 
the measure of total cost.  
 
Insert table 5 around here 
 
The estimates in table 5 indicate that our unexpected results are very robust to the 
choice of a production process. Applying the intermediation approach, we again find that 
foreign banks exhibit superior efficiency, that public banks tend to be more efficient than 
domestic private banks, and that the latter efficiency gap becomes statistically significant 
after the introduction of deposit insurance. It is suggested therefore that the superior effi-
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ciency of public over private banks is not an inheritance of some communist past, but a 
fact of contemporaneous Russian banking markets.   
One explanation for this puzzle could be that public and private banks have differ-
ent sets of activities and that the typical activity mix of public banks involves fewer costs 
than that which is typical of private banks. In table 6, we test this idea by including meas-
ures of the activity mix in the equation explaining inefficiency.  
 
Include table 6 around here 
 
In each panel of table 6, we consider the activity mix in the form of lending and de-
posit shares by type of customer (households, firms, government, banks) and the average 
loan quality (measured as the ratio of classified loans to total loans).
14 In panels A and B 
we apply the production approach, in panels C and D the intermediation approach. Panels 
A and C identify public banks by ownership, while panels B and D identify public banks 
by revealed activities involving the government. In each panel we have 4 specifications. In 
specification (a) we include the regional dummies in the estimation of the efficient frontier 
and all the activity mix variables in the equation explaining inefficiency. In specification 
(b) we additionally include equity in the estimation of the efficient frontier. In specification 
(c) we include the regional dummies and the activity mix variables in the estimation of the 
efficient frontier, leaving only loan quality as an explanatory variable for the residual inef-
ficiency. In specification (d) we include the regional dummies, equity and the set of activ-
ity mix variables in the estimation of the frontier, again leaving only loan quality as an ex-
planatory variable for residual inefficiency. Our three main results are highly robust in all 
these exercises. Foreign banks are again more efficient than domestic private banks. Public 
banks tend to be more efficient than domestic private ones. This effect seems to be stronger 
after than before the introduction of deposit insurance. Moreover, the results are stronger 
rather than weaker in some cases. In panel A, for example (production approach, public 
ownership), the public banks’ superior efficiency becomes statistically evident even for the 
pre-deposit-insurance period. In panel C (intermediation approach, public ownership), the 
 
14 Since the bank share and the government share are zero for many banks, their sum is the omitted variable for 
both lending and deposits. The results do not change if instead households or firms are the excluded category. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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public banks become less inefficient than even the foreign banks in the pre-deposit-
insurance period.  
 
 
7  Further robustness checks 
 
The summary statistics in table 2 indicate that public banks are on average very large com-
pared to domestic private banks. If scale economies are present in the Russian banking sec-
tor, these considerable size differences may explain our results. Note however that one 
could also hypothesize that large Russian private banks are less efficient than their smaller 
competitors. Claeys and Schoors (2007) find that large Russian banks enjoy regulatory 
forbearance from the part of the Central Bank of Russia. Having such soft legal constraints 
means that managers of larger banks are subject to less regulatory pressure. This gives the 
managers greater freedom to maximize the private benefits of control, which may come at 
the cost of lower efficiency. To control for the size effect we repeat our estimations for a 
size-matched sample. The matching procedure for the two sub-periods is as follows:  
1.  We exclude the largest public banks, Sberbank, Vneshtorgbank and Gazprombank 
from the two samples. They dominate the market and their special status (see above) 
may drive the results.  
2.  For each of the remaining public banks, we identify in each time period 20 size-
matched (size in terms of total assets) private domestic banks. Specifically, we select 
the closest 10 larger and the closest 10 smaller private domestic banks that have not 
been selected yet for the given period. This yields two lists of matching banks, one for 
the sample before deposit insurance and one for the sample after deposit insurance.  
3.  Finally, we balance the sample by dropping all banks that fail to show up in all 4 quar-
ters of the sub-period.  
 
This procedure yields 123 matching private domestic banks before deposit insurance (492 
bank observations) and 141 matching private domestic banks after deposit insurance (564 
bank observations). All foreign banks are retained in the sample. In annex A.1 we present 
summary statistics for this matched sample. One observes that the size differences are now 
substantially smaller than in the full sample of table 2.  
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In table 7, we repeat the estimations with all possible controls of panel A in table 6. In an-
nex A.2 we show the reproduced estimations with the size-matched datasets from the re-
maining panels of table 6. Our three main findings are robust, but the estimated efficiency 
gap becomes smaller in most specifications. The public bank variable remains negative in 
all specifications of all panels, although its significance falters in some specifications of the 
intermediation approach (see Annex A.2). Apparently the observed efficiency gap between 
public and private banks is not only driven by size differences or by the special position 
enjoyed by CBR-owned large public banks, but also by some genuine efficiency differ-
ences.  
 As a further robustness check we employed a two-stage DEA procedure. In the 
first stage we estimate time-specific bank efficiency scores for each quarter. We use the 
quarterly efficiency scores for each bank to compute its mean efficiency scores for each 
year (2002 before the reform, 2006 after the reform). In a second stage, we regress these 
mean efficiency scores on a set of determinants (public ownership, foreign ownership, ac-
tivity) using a Tobit estimator. This exercise was performed on both the full and size-
matched samples. Results for the second stage Tobit regressions are presented in table 8. 
Note that DEA is a totally different estimation strategy, often leading to quite different re-
sults. The interpretation of the signs is now different, since DEA measures efficiency 
rather than inefficiency and since the estimates are time-specific rather than panel esti-
mates.  
 
Insert table 8 around here.  
 
 From table 8 we observe that foreign banks are again found to be more efficient 
than domestic banks. The efficiency of publicly owned banks is never significantly differ-
ent from that of private banks. The introduction of deposit insurance again seems to affect 
efficiency differences in favor of foreign banks and public banks. In the case of publicly 
owned banks, the signs of the estimates change from insignificantly negative in 2002 to 




 BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




8  Concluding remarks 
 
For the Russian banking market we document three highly robust results with respect to 
bank efficiency. Foreign banks are more efficient than domestic private banks (no sur-
prise), domestic private banks are not more efficient than public banks (surprise) and the 
introduction of deposit insurance increased any existing efficiency gap between public and 
private banks (big surprise). These results are not driven by the choice of production proc-
ess, environment, risk preferences, activity mix, size, or econometric approach.  
This result of foreign banks’ superior efficiency agrees with most of the related lit-
erature on transition countries. Namely, Weill (2003), Fries and Taci (2005) and Bonin et 
al. (2005a) come to similar conclusions based on samples of banks from various transition 
countries. This finding is also highly robust in the specifications that take account of envi-
ronment, equity, size and structure of activities. It may find its origin in both reasons pro-
posed by Weill (2003). On the one hand, most shareholders of foreign banks are them-
selves banks. Consequently, these shareholders can provide their know-how in organiza-
tion and risk analysis to their subsidiaries. On the other hand, foreign banks would benefit 
from better corporate governance as shareholders originating from Western economies 
would be more accustomed to monitoring bank managers. 
But why are private banks not more efficient than public banks in Russia?  This un-
expected finding is neither in accordance with the general prior that public ownership is 
less efficient than private ownership, nor with the findings of Bonin et al. (2005a) and 
Fries and Taci (2005) for cross-country samples of banks from Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries. Implicit state guarantees may have rendered Russia’s public banks’ access 
to deposits less costly in terms of labor and physical capital, resulting in higher efficiency. 
A greater depositor base may in turn lead to a greater pool of loan applicants. Therefore, 
public banks may also benefit from granting a larger amount of loans than private banks 
for the same level of costs, because they must expend less effort to find borrowers. But if 
this explanation is true, the creation of a more level playing field via the introduction of a 
generalized deposit insurance scheme, no matter how incomplete, should have mitigated 
the efficiency difference, and yet we obtained the opposite result. So this explanation must 
be abandoned. Still deposit insurance may have played a role through moral hazard. There 
is strong evidence that Russian private domestic banks were subject to strong and sophisti-Alexei Karas, Koen Schoors and Laurent Weill 
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cated market discipline before the introduction of deposit insurance (see Karas, Schoors 
and Pyle, 2006). This forced them to improve their efficiency. The introduction of deposit 
insurance may however have reduced the pressure from market discipline, without replac-
ing it with sufficiently strong regulatory pressure. In short, the introduction of deposit in-
surance may have introduced moral hazard, leading to more, rather than less, inefficient 
management practices in private banks.  
Alternatively, the observed increase in the efficiency gap between public and pri-
vate banks may be due to increased switching costs (see Kim et al., 2003). These switching 
costs notably derive from costs linked to the time and effort needed to close an account and 
open it elsewhere, to become comfortable with unfamiliar procedures and new bank em-
ployees, and from costs related to the loss of capitalized value of established relationships. 
Switching costs may also endogenously result from the fact that banks benefit from better 
information on their clients as compared to their competitors (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992). 
The widespread trust in public banks accumulated through their long dominance of the 
Russian retail markets and the renewed distrust of private banks after the ‘mini-crisis’ of 
May-July 2004 (see above) may have increased the costs of switching from public to pri-
vate banks. More importantly, the several weeks of turbulence on the Russian inter-bank 
market triggered by the CBR’s intervention in the case of a bank accused of money-
laundering, reduced depositors’ trust in the banking system and led to a “flight to quality”, 
i.e. a shift of deposits from private to public banks.  
Given the fact that Russian public banks are not more inefficient than private ones, 
the large state presence in the Russian banking sector is not necessarily the cause of its 
relative inefficiency and the well-known corollaries of lower credit levels and more finan-
cial instability. The implication is that bank privatization will not necessarily improve the 
efficiency of the Russian banking system. Since the main inefficiency seems to reside with 
domestic private banks, the system’s efficiency may benefit more from increased competi-
tion than from privatization. This can be achieved by creating a more level and more stable 
regulatory playing field for all banks, an objective on which the CBR is making progress, 
and by opening the market to foreign competition. In this light, the CBR’s relentless ef-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




                                                
forts
15 of the last years (2006-2007) to get rid of inefficient and fraudulent banks regardless 
of their size and the increasing access of foreign banks to the Russian banking sector may 




15 These efforts are deeply resented by some banks that fear losing their license and culminated in the brutal 
murder in October 2006 of the Mr. Kozlov, vice president of the CBR in charge of bank licensing policy. The 
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Table 1  Some Indicators of recent developments in the Russian banking sector 
Data as at start of period unless otherwise indicated  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Number  of  credit  organizations  2126 2003 1828 1668 1518 1409 
     with banking license  1311  1319  1329  1329  1299  1253 
     license to attract private deposits  1239  1223  1202  1190  1165  1045 
     license to conduct foreign  currency  operations  764 810 839 845 839 827 
     general license  244  262  293  310  311  301 
     license for operations with precious metals  163  171  175  181  182  184 
Foreign credit organizations with  banking  license  130 125 126 128 131 136 
     fully foreign owned   22  23  27  32  33  41 
     50 to 100% foreign owned  11  12  10  9  9  11 
Total  number  of  branches    3793 3433 3326 3219 3238 3295 
     of which branches of Sberbank  1529  1233  1162  1045  1011  1009 
     of which branches of fully foreign owned banks  7  9  12  15  16  29 
Corporate Lending/GDP (eop)  17% 19% 22% 25% 27% 32% 
Private  deposits/GDP  8%  10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 
Lending/Gross fixed capital  formation  (eop)  92%  105% 120% 137% 149% 177% 
Inflation (eop)  18.6%  15.1% 12.0% 11.7% 10.9% 9.0% 
Deposit rate (period average)  4.9% 5.0% 4.5% 3.8% 4.0% 4.1% 
Lending rate (period average)  17.9% 15.7% 13.0% 11.4% 10.7% 10.5% 
Sources: Rosstat, CBR and International Financial Statistics (IMF). 





  Table 2  Means of key variables for private and public banks 
 
 2002  2006 
  Private banks  Public banks  Private banks  Public banks 
Characteristics      
Total assets  1,213.56  17,585.80  2,934.71  160,481.92 
Total costs (production)  49.26  593.51  142.65  6,575.91 
Total costs (intermediation)  57.90  696.50  168.36  7,941.45 
Loans 901.67  12,400.59  2,182.47  118,575.98 
Deposits 855.46  9,406.17  2,278.33  127,781.46 
Investment assets  73.60  2,283.15  380.68  29,776.67 
Price of labor  0.0106  0.0105  0.0102  0.0078 
Price of physical capital  1.8113  1.5108  1.8488  2.0085 
Price of borrowed funds  0.0111  0.0089  0.0121  0.0110 
Equity/total  assets  0.2726 0.2348 0.1837 0.1297 
Bad loans / loans  0.0184  0.0247  0.0189  0.0114 
Loan activities       
Household loans / loans  0.0790  0.0232  0.1915  0.1474 
Firm loans / loans  0.6649  0.6622  0.6292  0.6654 
Government loans / loans  0.0108 0.0104 0.0066 0.0181 
Bank loans / loans  0.2453  0.3042  0.1726  0.1691 
Deposit activities        
Household dep./ deposits  0.2285  0.1267  0.4180  0.3526 
Firm deposits / deposits  0.6080  0.5889  0.4796  0.3888 
Government dep. /deposits 0.0262  0.1298  0.017  0.1232 
Bank dep. / deposits  0.1373  0.1547  0.0908  0.1355 
Environment      
Moscow  area  0.5192 0.5789 0.3706 0.4667 
      
Number of observations  2912  76  1824  60 
 
 Table 3  Means of key variables for domestic and foreign banks 
 
 2002  2006 
  Domestic banks  Foreign banks  Domestic banks  Foreign banks 
Characteristics      
Total assets  1,385.31  8,414.93  7,521.01  17,674.06 
Total cost (production)  55.35  277.95  332.89  677.80 
Total cost (intermediation)  64.70  336.12  398.33  812.46 
Loans 998.13  6,629.65  5,559.31  13,329.95 
Deposits 860.11  6,975.06  5,902.71  14,675.99 
Investment assets  111.20  645.49  1,243.35  2,974.54 
Price of labor  0.0107  0.0077  0.0103  0.0073 
Price of physical capital  1.7828  2.3836  1.8528  1.8800 
Price of borrowed funds  0.0112  0.0088  0.0122  0.0096 
Equity/total  assets  0.2725 0.2462 0.1827 0.1677 
Bad loans / loans  0.0184  0.0216  0.0172  0.0508 
Loan activities       
Household loans / loans  0.0792  0.0337  0.1904  0.1838 
Firm loans / loans  0.6718  0.4709  0.6360  0.5036 
Government loans / loans  0.0112 0.0001 0.0073 0.0001 
Bank loans / loans  0.2379  0.4954  0.1663  0.3125 
Deposit activities        
Household dep./ deposits  0.2290  0.1401  0.4277  0.1498 
Firm deposits / deposits  0.6150  0.4012  0.4809  0.3811 
Government dep. /deposits  0.0299 0.0001 0.0159 0.0001 
Bank dep. / deposits  0.1261  0.4585  0.0755  0.4691 
Environment      
Moscow  area  0.5118 0.7692 0.3503 0.9000 
      
Number of observations  2884  104  1804  80 
 Table 4  Inefficiency of public banks, production approach 
 
Panel A: Public banks defined as state-owned banks 
Frontier 
characteristics 















Intercept Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
























          
Log-likelihood -2203.909  -2192.782  -2189.672  -1278.612 -1270.417 -1200.630 
Panel B: Public banks defined as banks that receive a high share of interest income from government bodies 
Intercept Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
























            
Log-
likelihood 
-2205.207 -2194.002  -2190.745  -1282.249  -1274.881  -1202.208 
 
‘Environment’ means that regional dummies are included in the estimation of the cost frontier. ‘Equity’ refers to the inclusion of the bank’s equity in the estimation of the cost frontier.  
N=2988 for the first period, N=1884 for the second period. Absolute t-statistics in parentheses, *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. 
 Table 5  Inefficiency of public banks, intermediation approach  
 
Panel C: Public banks defined as state-owned banks 
Frontier 
characteristics 













Equity and  
environment 
Intercept Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
























          
Log-likelihood -1983.526  -1972.305  -1968.205  -1040.960 -1035.344 -1015.842 
Panel D: Public banks defined as banks that receive a high share of interest income from government bodies 
Intercept Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
























            
Log-
likelihood 
-1986.681 -1975.090  -1970.917  -1042.721  -1037.439  -1016.970 
 
‘Environment’ means that regional dummies are included in the estimation of the cost frontier. ‘Equity’ refers to the inclusion of the bank’s equity in the estimation of the cost frontier.  
N=2988 for the first period, N=1884 for the second period. Absolute t-statistics in parentheses, *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. 
 Table 6  Robustness to differences in activity mix 
 
Panel A  Public banks defined as state-owned banks, production approach 
 














Intercept Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
















Household deposits %  Yes  Yes  -  - 
Firm deposits %  Yes  Yes  -  - 
Household loans %  Yes  Yes  -  - 
Firm loans %  Yes  Yes  -  - 
Bad loans %  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Log-likelihood -2163.004  -2162.106 -2130.126  -2128.461 
Post-generalized deposit insurance (2006) 
Intercept Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
















Household deposits %  Yes  Yes  -  - 
Firm deposits %  Yes  Yes  -  - 
Household loans %  Yes  Yes  -  - 
Firm loans %  Yes  Yes  -  - 
Bad loans %  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood  -1226;456 -1165.323  -1230.926 -1143.223 
  5Panel B  Public banks defined as banks that receive a high share of interest income from government 
bodies, production approach 
 














Intercept Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
















Household deposits %  Yes  Yes  -  - 
Firm deposits %  Yes  Yes  -  - 
Household loans %  Yes  Yes  -  - 
Firm loans %  Yes  Yes  -  - 
Bad loans %  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Log-likelihood -2163.432  -2162.537 -2130.490  -2128.775 
Post-generalized deposit insurance (2006) 
Intercept Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
















Household deposits %  Yes  Yes  -  - 
Firm deposits %  Yes  Yes  -  - 
Household loans %  Yes  Yes  -  - 
Firm loans %  Yes  Yes  -  - 
Bad loans %  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Log-likelihood  -1231.047 -1167.378  -1235.123 -1145.789 
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Intercept Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
















Household deposits %  Yes  Yes  -  - 
Firm deposits %  Yes  Yes  -  - 
Household loans %  Yes  Yes  -  - 
Firm loans %  Yes  Yes  -  - 
Bad loans %  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Log-likelihood -1917.841  -1916.956 -1917.810  -1917.737 
Post-generalized deposit insurance (2006) 
Intercept Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
















Household deposits %  Yes  Yes  -  - 
Firm deposits %  Yes  Yes  -  - 
Household loans %  Yes  Yes  -  - 
Firm loans %  Yes  Yes  -  - 
Bad loans %  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood  -951.341 -932.902  -998.824 -975.377 
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Panel D  Public banks defined as banks that receive a high share of interest income from the government 
bodies, intermediation approach 
 














Intercept Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
















Household deposits %  Yes  Yes  -  - 
Firm deposits %  Yes  Yes  -  - 
Household loans %  Yes  Yes  -  - 
Firm loans %  Yes  Yes  -  - 
Bad loans %  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Log-likelihood -1919.707  -1918.822 -1919.208  -1919.153 
Post-generalized deposit insurance (2006) 
Intercept Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
















Household deposits %  Yes  Yes  -  - 
Firm deposits %  Yes  Yes  -  - 
Household loans %  Yes  Yes  -  - 
Firm loans %  Yes  Yes  -  - 
Bad loans %  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Log-likelihood  -953.868 -934.310  -1000.718 -976.560 
 
 Table 7  Size-matched results 
 
Panel A  Public banks defined as state-owned banks, production approach 
 














Intercept Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 












































Log-likelihood -397.439  -397.026  -390.969  -390.955 
Post-generalized deposit insurance (2006) 
Intercept Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 












































Log-likelihood  -360.661 -332.218  -349.916 -339.517 
 
 
  9Table 8  Robustness to other econometric techniques: DEA 
 
Panel A: Public banks defined as state-owned banks, full sample 
Frontier 
characteristics 
Before generalised deposit insurance (2002) After generalised deposit insurance (2006)
 (a)   (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Intercept Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
























Activities -  Yes  Yes - Yes  Yes 
Bad loans  -  -  Yes  -  -  Yes 
          
Log-likelihood  733.983  776.945 785.229  525.603 538.238 538.296 
Panel B: Public banks defined as state-owned banks, size-matched sample 
Intercept Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
























Activities -  Yes  Yes -  Yes  Yes 
Bad loans  -  -  Yes  -  -  Yes 
            
Log-
likelihood 
85.342 93.296  94.764  130.483  147.455  149.411 
 
‘Environment’ means that regional dummies are included in the estimation of the cost frontier. ‘Equity’ refers to the inclusion of the bank’s equity in the estimation of the cost frontier.  
N=747 for the first period, N=471 for the second period. Absolute t-statistics in parentheses, *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% or 1% level 
  10Figure 1 Sberbank’s dominance in personal deposit market 
 
 





























































Sberbank private deposits Total private deposits Share of Sberbank in total private deposits
 
Source: own calculations based on CBR Bulletin of Bank Statistics and Sberbank 
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ANNEX 
 
Table A.1  Means of key variables for private and public banks, size-matched sample 
 
 2002  2006 
  Private banks  Public banks  Private banks  Public banks 
Characteristics      
Total assets  5,151.91  7,401.68  8,121.43  32,322.32 
Total costs (production)  203.89  281.03  388.71  1,108.36 
Total costs (intermediation)  240.25  339.56  459.19  1,352.25 
Loans 3,911.10  4,898.84  6,058.27  23,751.46 
Deposits 3,763.33  5,315.51  6,332.80  25,765.57 
Investment assets  325.33  915.25  1,143.52  5,345.11 
Price of labor  0.0083  0.0112  0.0087  0.0087 
Price of physical capital  2.4495  1.2885  2.1035  1.5660 
Price of borrowed funds  0.0105  0.0086  0.0125  0.0111 
Equity/total  assets  0.2149 0.2313 0.1448 0.1341 
Bad loans / loans  0.0207  0.0229  0.0203  0.0107 
Loan activities       
Household loans / loans  0.0495  0.0248  0.1632  0.1591 
Firm loans / loans  0.6163  0.6586  0.6431  0.6606 
Government loans / loans  0.0099 0.0111 0.0074 0.0189 
Bank loans / loans  0.3243  0.3055  0.1862  0.1614 
Deposit activities        
Household dep./ deposits  0.1977  0.1204  0.3755  0.3561 
Firm deposits / deposits  0.5180  0.5858  0.4606  0.3872 
Government dep. /deposits  0.0359 0.1438 0.0186 0.1452 
Bank dep. / deposits  0.2484  0.1501  0.1454  0.1115 
Environment      
Moscow  area  0.6016 0.5882 0.5106 0.4167 
      
Number of observations  492  68  564  48 
 Table A.2 Further size-matched results 
 
Panel B  Public banks defined as banks that receive a high share of interest income from government bodies, 
production approach 
 














Intercept Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 












































Log-likelihood -399.040  -397.810  -390.961  -390.958 
Post-generalized deposit insurance (2006) 
Intercept Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 












































Log-likelihood  -365.493 -320.609  -350.452 -340.378 
  13Panel C  Public banks defined as state-owned banks, intermediation approach 
 














Intercept Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 












































Log-likelihood -327.203  -326.982  -333.275  -331.822 
Post-generalized deposit insurance (2006) 
Intercept Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 












































Log-likelihood  -220.328 -218.397  -205.273 -200.991 
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Panel D  Public banks defined as banks that receive a high share of interest income from government bodies, 
intermediation approach 
 














Intercept Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 












































Log-likelihood -331.408  -331.208  -334.246  -332.787 
Post-generalized deposit insurance (2006) 
Intercept Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 












































Log-likelihood  -223.653 -222.113  -205.615 -201.543 
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